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THE EMERGING CUSTOM OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS-BASED DEVELOPMENT: A MODEL 
AGREEMENT FOR SUCCESSFUL 
EXPLOITATION OF LAKE ALBERT’S OIL 
RESERVES 
Angela M. Bushnell* 
Abstract: The 2006 discovery of oil reserves beneath Lake Albert on the 
border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda has 
spawned both tension and attempts at cooperative development. History 
demonstrates that the process of exploiting natural resources is almost 
inevitably interwoven with violations of the human rights of local popula-
tions. This Note catalogs the possible human rights violations that can oc-
cur with the development of a natural resource such as oil, and discusses 
the growing pattern and practice of using human rights-based planning 
in international development agreements. The author proposes that in-
corporating human rights-based planning into the development agree-
ment between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda may 
help to prevent violations of the recognized rights of the population in 
the Lake Albert region. 
Introduction 
 In 2006, Canada’s Heritage Oil Corporation discovered oil reserves 
beneath Lake Albert, one of Africa’s seven great lakes.1 The discovery 
brought as much tension as it did hope: Lake Albert sprawls across the 
indistinct border between the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) and Uganda.2 The countries’ overlapping claims are set amidst a 
region that has been fraught with conflict for years, fueled in part by 
                                                                                                                      
* Angela Bushnell is an Articles Editor for the Boston College International & Compara-
tive Law Review. 
1 See Press Release, Heritage Oil Corp., Heritage Oil Reports Third Quarter 2006 Re-
sults and Operational Update (Nov. 14, 2006), http://www.heritageoilltd.com/news/press 
Release06.cfm (follow “14 November 2006” hyperlink) [hereinafter Heritage Third Quar-
ter Results]. 
2 See Do You Want to Share or to Fight? The Question Posed by the Oil Find in Lake Albert, 
economist, Aug. 25, 2007, at 45 [hereinafter Share or Fight?]. 
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disputes over valuable natural resources.3 For the moment, DRC and 
Uganda have agreed to resurvey the watery border and collaborate on 
oil exploration and development, including the building of a pipeline.4 
 History, however, warns of additional problems that will require a 
cooperative solution: oil exploitation has been consistently linked to 
environmental degradation, human rights abuses, and local conflict.5 
Indigenous populations in oil-rich regions in Ecuador, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Nigeria have all suffered negative repercussions from de-
velopment, including destruction of their livelihoods, the taking of 
land without compensation, involuntary resettlement, and in some 
cases, violent repression and protest.6 These harsh by-products are vio-
lations of the local population’s fundamental rights, including the right 
to adequate living conditions, the right to earn a livelihood, and the 
right to property, which are enshrined in treaties and customary inter-
national law.7 
 The 2006 oil strike has already negatively impacted the economic 
rights of the Lake Albert-area inhabitants: their ability to fish is devas-
tated and they are restricted from certain areas.8 Continued oil devel-
opment will likely create fundamental changes to the environment, 
which will further damage the local population’s livelihood and prop-
erty rights.9  Yet just as the experiences of other states foretold of the 
conflicts in development, the emerging custom of human rights-based 
                                                                                                                      
3 See Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 
I.C.J. 1, ¶¶ 23, 238–242, 246, 248–250, 259 (Dec. 19, 2005). 
4 See News Release, State House of Uganda, Uganda and DRC Sign Joint Bilateral 
Agreement (Sept. 9, 2007), http://www.statehouse.go.ug/news.detail.php?newsId=1314& 
category=News%20Release [hereinafter Uganda News Release]; DRC and Uganda Ease Oil 
Tensions, BBC News, Sept. 8, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6984758.stm [here-
inafter Oil Tensions Ease]. 
5See Human Rights Watch, The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Hu-
man Rights Violations in Nigeria’s Oil Producing Countries I ( Jan. 1, 1999) [here-
inafter The Price of Oil]; Inter-American Comm’n on Human Rights, Report on the Situa-
tion of Human Rights in Ecuador, ch. VIII, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96 (Apr. 24, 1997) [hereinafter 
Inter-Am. C.H.R.]. 
6 See Tom O’Neill, Curse of the Black Gold: Hope and Betrayal in the Niger Delta, Nat’l Geo-
graphic, Feb. 2007, at 88, 97–117; Amnesty Int’l, Equatorial Guinea: Fear of Forced 
Evictions/Fear of Use of Excessive Force (2006), 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AFR24/012/2006/en. See generally Inter-Am. C.H.R., 
supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
7 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, arts. 6 
§§ 1–2, 11 § 1, Dec. 16, 1966, 1966 U.S.T. 521, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
8 See Sarah Grainger, Uganda and Congo’s Troubled Waters, BBC News, Aug. 16, 2007, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/africa/6948086.stm. 
9 See, e.g., Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
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development poses a solution.10 A human rights approach to oil ex-
ploitation would enable DRC and Uganda to minimize the risk of vio-
lations of rights, and address problems that do arise through a strat-
egy that promotes social sustainability.11 
 This N ote thus proposes human rights-based policies, programs 
and standards that DRC and Uganda should incorporate into their 
2007 oil development agreement.12 Part I outlines the oil agreements 
between DRC and Uganda, and each country’s human rights obliga-
tions under international law. Part I also demonstrates the empirical 
link between oil exploitation and human rights violations, and provides 
an overview of customary international law. Part II discusses the human 
rights violations that are likely to occur in DRC and Uganda, and how 
other states have used human rights-based development to mitigate 
such effects. Part III applies human rights-based development planning 
to the exploitation of oil reserves in Lake Albert. 
I. Background 
A. Existing Oil-Sharing Agreements 
 DRC and Uganda have two agreements regarding shared oil re-
serves.13 A bilateral agreement signed in 1990 pledged cooperation in 
petroleum exploration in the Lake Albert region (1990 Agreement).14 
DRC and Uganda agreed to negotiate in goodwill the development of 
any discovered oil reserves, relying on continued cooperation as op-
posed to a strict delimitation of the shared border.15 
 In 2006, Heritage Oil Corporation (Heritage Oil) struck oil in the 
Ugandan waters of Lake Albert.16 Heritage Oil owns a fifty-percent 
share in two exploration licenses on the Ugandan side of the lake, and 
has a Production Sharing Agreement with DRC for exploitation on the 
                                                                                                                      
10 See Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights (OHCHR), Frequently 
Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Coopera-
tion 19 HR/PUB/06/8 (2006) [hereinafter OHCHR]. 
11 See Caroline Moser et al., Overseas Development Institute, To Claim Our 
Rights: Livelihood Security, Human Rights and Sustainable Development 37–41 
(2001), available at http://www.odi.org.uk/rights/Publications/tcor.pdf. 
12 See OHCHR, supra note 10, at 19. 
13 See Frank Nyakairu, Hand over Soldiers Today, Uganda Tells Congo Army, Monitor, Aug. 
6, 2007, available at http://allafrica.com/stories/200708060046.html. 
14 See Uganda News Release, supra note 4; Nyakairu, supra note 13. 
15 See Nyakairu, supra note 13. 
16 See Heritage Third Quarter Results, supra note 1. 
86 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:83 
Congolese side.17 U.K.-based Tullow Oil P.L.C. (Tullow Oil) has an in-
terest in three concessions in Ugandan waters.18 Tullow Oil also has a 
production sharing agreement with DRC.19  At present, no exploration 
has taken place in DRC-controlled waters.20 
 Congolese President Joseph Kabila and Ugandan President Yoweri 
Museveni signed an agreement in 2007 (2007 Agreement) that largely 
reiterated the commitments in the 1990 Agreement.21 Both countries 
pledged to create a joint committee to resurvey the common border, 
establish a joint security force on Rukwanzi Island, and cooperate in 
the exploration and exploitation of shared oil reserves.22 
B. Oil Exploitation and Human Rights Violations 
 There is no shortage of examples of how oil exploitation can ir-
reparably degrade the environment, and deprive the local population 
of fundamental economic rights.23 Nigeria, the largest oil exporting 
nation in Africa,24 is one of the worst examples of development-related 
human rights abuses.25 After decades of unresolved pollution and land 
disputes with the federal government, the Ogoni, an ethnic group in 
one of the oil-rich regions, peacefully mobilized to protest against oil 
development policies.26 The government responded by creating a spe-
cial security force that forcefully silenced any opposition and commit-
ted wide-spread human rights abuses.27 Oil exploitation continued with 
no regard for the rights of the local population: the construction of 
pipelines and wells altered the environment, often polluting waterways 
with spills and other waste, while residents watched as their land was 
essentially “taken” from them and their fishing livelihoods were de-
                                                                                                                      
17 See Heritage Oil Corp., About Heritage Oil, http://www.heritageoilltd.com/about. 
cfm (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). 
18 See Nyakairu, supra note 13; Tullow Oil plc, Uganda Operations and Licences http:// 
www.tullowoil.com/tlw/operations/africa/uganda/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008). 
19 See Tullow Oil P.L.C., Congo (DRC) Operations and Licences, http://www.tullow 
oil.com/tlw/operations/africa/congodrc/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Tullow 
Oil plc]. 
20 See Nyakairu, supra note 13; Tullow Oil plc, supra note 19. 
21 See Uganda News Release, supra note 4. 
22 See id.; Oil Tensions Ease, supra note 4. 
23 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 99, 102, 108–09, 111, 112; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 
5, ch. VIII. 
24 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 100. 
25 See id. at 97–117; The Price of Oil, supra note 5, at I. 
26 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 113; The Price of Oil, supra note 5, at I. 
27 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 113; The Price of Oil, supra note 5, at I. 
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stroyed.28 Today, the frustration and disenfranchisement manifests in 
armed rebels who wreak havoc in the delta states.29 
 Ecuador’s oil development resulted in similar, egregious rights 
abuses.30 The indigenous population has title to oil-rich lands in the 
Oriente region, but neighboring development of those resources caused 
significant damage to the local ecosystem.31 The resultant pollution 
caused wide-spread health problems and interfered with the indigenous 
people’s agricultural and fishing practices.32 
 These tragic examples chronicle the oil-related environmental 
degradation that can deprive local populations of sustainable resources 
for their livelihoods, as well as their land.33 Although human rights 
abuses are not necessarily inevitable, abuse is more likely to occur dur-
ing early stages of economic transition.34 DRC and Uganda will need to 
construct drill sites and pipelines as they transition into oil exploitation, 
and such construction can alter the environment, thus risking deroga-
tion of human rights.35 Moreover, political pressure can provoke rights 
abuses as society transitions from a fishing, agrarian and trading econ-
omy to an oil-based one.36 
C. Primary Sources of Congolese and Ugandan Human Rights  
Obligations: International and National Instruments 
 The three fundamental economic rights that are implicated in oil 
development are the right to adequate living conditions, the right to 
earn a livelihood, and the right to property.37 These rights are recog-
nized by DRC and Uganda in international and regional agreements, 
such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
                                                                                                                      
28 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 97–117. 
29 See id. 
30 See Lila Barrera-Hernandez, Sovereignty over Natural Resources Under Examination: The 
Inter-American System for Human Rights and Natural Resource Allocation, 12 Ann. Surv. Int’l & 
Comp. L. 43, 49–50 (2006); Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
31 See Barrera-Hernandez, supra note 30, at 49–50. 
32 See Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
33 See id.; O’Neill, supra note 6, at 99, 102, 108–09, 111, 112. 
34 See Jack Donnelly, Repression and Development: The Political Contingency of Human Rights 
Trade-offs, in Human Rights and Development 305, 312, 313, 316–17(David P. Forsythe 
ed., 1989). 
35 See id.; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
36 See Donnelly, supra note 34, at 312, 313, 316–17. 
37 See, e.g., O’Neill, supra note 6, at 99, 102, 108–09, 111, 112. 
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Rights (Bujal Charter).38 Both countries also uphold these rights in 
their national constitutions.39 DRC and Uganda have thus internalized 
obligations to protect these rights and should use preventive or com-
pensatory actions to do so.40 
D. Emerging Customary International Law 
 A custom in international law is established by a pattern of state 
practice that implies general consent to a binding principle of inter-
national law.41 The creation of a customary norm is much like creat-
ing a snowball by rolling the core down a wintery hill: as more and 
more states adopt similar practices, the pattern of practice grows into 
a consensus.42 Consensus is not determined by the passage of time, 
but rather by the extent to which state practices are uniform both in-
ternally (the same state implements the same practice over time) and 
collectively (a pattern of practice amongst states).43 Relatively uniform 
practice can create a binding custom on states, but the extent to 
which the custom becomes a rule is largely dependent on whether 
states believe that the conduct is legally permissible or creates legal 
obligations.44 This opinio juris sive necessitates defines when a pattern of 
practice becomes customary international law.45 
 An emerging custom is a snowball in the making—a common 
practice adopted by different states in similar situations, but one that 
has not been repeatedly used by the same states, uniformly applied by 
a substantial number of states, or incurred legal effects.46 Although 
                                                                                                                      
38 See African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights arts. 14, 21, June 27, 1981, 21 
I.L.M. 58 [hereinafter Bujal Charter]; ICESCR, supra note 7, arts. 6 §§ 1–2, 11 § 1; Univer-
sal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, arts. 12, 17, 25 § 1, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
39 See Constitution de la République Démocratique du Congo Preamble, arts. 30, 
34, 35, 36, 48, 54, 58; Constitution of the Republic of Uganda arts. 26, 40. 
40 See Moser et al., supra note 11, at 48. 
41 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880–81 (2d Cir. 1980); Comm. on the For-
mation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Int’l Law Ass’n, Final Report of the Committee: State-
ment of Principles Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, 69 Int’l L. 
Ass’n Rep. of Confs. 712, 719 (2000) [hereinafter ILA Report 2000]. 
42 See Comm. on the Formation of Customary (Gen.) Int’l Law, Int’l Law Ass’n, 3rd In-
terim Report of the Committee on the Formation of Customary (General) International Law, 67 Int’l 
L. Ass’n Rep. of Confs. 623, 626, 630 (1996). 
43 See ILA Report 2000, supra note 41, at 731, 732. 
44 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81; ILA Report 2000, supra note 41, at 745. 
45 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81; ILA Report 2000, supra note 41, at 745. 
46 See ILA Report 2000, supra note 41, at 731–34. 
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the emerging custom is not yet legally binding, the common practice 
expresses preferred outcomes, and can serve as a soft law precedent.47 
 A substantial number of states have recognized and applied a 
human rights-based approach to development, which integrates hu-
man rights norms into the plans and operations for growth.48 State 
action has largely been through the articulation of human rights-
centered policies, and the actual mechanisms in development pro-
gramming have varied.49 Human rights-based development is thus an 
emerging custom, because it is a common practice adopted by differ-
ent states in similar situations, but one which still has significant varia-
tion and no legal effects.50 Although not yet binding, human rights-
based development is an important precedent for DRC and Uganda 
as they move forward with oil exploration and development.51 
II. Discussion 
 The empirical link between oil exploitation and environmental 
damage and human rights abuses indicates that DRC and Uganda face 
a real risk of violating their obligations under international human 
rights law through oil development activities.52 The growing practice of 
human rights-based development can be a valuable soft law precedent 
for addressing those anticipated violations of human rights and pro-
moting sustainable society in the Lake Albert region.53 
A. DRC and Uganda: The Risk of Human Rights Violations 
 The current burdens on the Congolese and Ugandan populations 
who live and work along the shores of Lake Albert presage the human 
rights violations that commonly occur during the exploration and de-
                                                                                                                      
47 See Edith Brown Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 
345, 352 (2000). 
48 See Development Assistance Committee (DAC), Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, DAC Action-Oriented Policy Paper on Human 
Rights and Development 3–6 (2007); Laure-Hélène Piron & Tammie O’Neil, Over-
seas Development Institute, Integrating Human Rights into Development: A Syn-
thesis of Donor Approaches and Experiences 3, 12 box 3.1, 19 box 3.8, 22–23 & box 
3.12, 24 box 3.13 (2005). 
49 See Piron & O’Neil, supra note 48, at 3, 12 box 3.1, 19 box 3.8, 22–23 & box 3.12, 24 
box 3.13. 
50 See id. 
51 See OHCHR, supra note 10, at 15–18; Moser et al., supra note 11, at 37–41. 
52 See, e.g., ICESCR, supra note 7, arts. 6 §§ 1–2, 11 § 1; O’Neill, supra note 6, at 99, 102, 
108–09, 111. 
53 See OHCHR, supra note 10, at 15–18, 19; Moser et al., supra note 11, at 37–41. 
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velopment of oil reserves.54 The situations in Nigeria and Ecuador are 
representative of the relationship between oil development and in-
fringements of the right to adequate living conditions, the right to earn 
a livelihood and the right to property.55 
 The development of oil reserves beneath Lake Albert will require 
the building of new infrastructure similar to that in Nigeria and Ecua-
dor, such as the drilling of additional wells to draw on subsurface oil, 
and the construction of a pipeline to transfer reserves to the coast for 
export.56 The massive excavation and construction can unavoidably al-
ter waterways and drainage patterns, which can lead to flooding during 
the rainy seasons, pollution of water sources through waste run-off, and 
the spread of diseases.57 Such conditions can thus infringe the local 
population’s right to adequate living conditions.58 
 The exploitation of oil reserves also poses a substantial risk of pol-
lution from leaks and spills, which can destroy agrarian and fishing live-
lihoods.59 Thousands of Nigerians living in the delta region watched 
helplessly as leaking pipelines polluted the water and killed or drove 
away the fish that were their livelihood.60 Similarly, a substantial Congo-
lese and Ugandan population relies on fishing in Lake Albert for both 
subsistence and trade.61 Local fishermen already face restriction related 
to the oil-inspired border dispute: an August 2007 ban on fishing at 
night negatively impacts the income of approximately 20,000 fishermen 
who rely on a nighttime harvest of a particular kind of fish.62 Future 
environmental degradation like that in Nigeria could further deprive 
thousands of Congolese and Ugandans of their right to earn a liveli-
hood.63 
 Furthermore, the devastating environmental changes caused by 
development activities in some countries have been linked to unlawful 
takings of private land, which amount to a deprivation of the individ-
ual’s right to property.64 Local populations may be forced to resettle 
                                                                                                                      
54 See Grainger, supra note 8; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
55 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 97–117; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
56 See Share or Fight?, supra note 2, at 45; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
57 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 108–12; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
58 See Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
59 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 108–09, 111, 112. 
60 See id. at 99, 102, 108–09, 111, 112. 
61 See Patrick Jaramogi & Fred Kayizzi, Uganda: Fishing at Night on Lake Albert, New Vi-
sion, Aug. 22, 2007. 
62 See id. 
63 See O’Neill, supra note 6, at 88, 97–117. 
64 See id. at 108–09, 111, 112; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
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when the land becomes uninhabitable and their ability to earn a liveli-
hood is diminished.65 Also, the needs of oil exploitation may necessitate 
state-seizure of private land.66 In addition to resettlement, the displaced 
population is entitled to adequate compensation for lost property.67 
The state that lacks a resettlement plan for oil-related development ac-
tivities, and is otherwise unprepared to compensate the local popula-
tion for seized land, violates the individuals’ right to property.68 Reset-
tlement and compensation plans will pose a special challenge for DRC 
and Uganda, where years of fighting between government and rebel 
forces have internally displaced large numbers of persons and placed 
an enormous strain on national resources.69 
B. Evidence of an Emerging Custom and a Solution 
 A number of states have acknowledged a rights-based approach as 
a norm for the preferred outcome of protecting human rights during 
development.70 Human rights approaches have been applied by states 
individually and through their participation in international organiza-
tions.71 The World Bank and various divisions of the United Nations, 
including the UN Development Program, require or encourage states 
to incorporate certain provisions into development agreements in or-
der to protect human rights.72 State parties to those agreements explic-
                                                                                                                      
65 See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85, 3 ¶ 3, 5 ¶ 2, 7 ¶ 10, 8 ¶ 1, OEA/SerL/V/II66 
(Mar. 5, 1985); see also  World Bank Operational Manual OP 4.12 (2001)(recognizing that 
involuntary resettlement may result from the taking of land caused by loss of assets or access 
to assets, loss of income sources or means of livelihood, or restricted access to areas that re-
sults in adverse impacts on the persons’ livelihoods). 
66 See Equatorial Guinea: Fear of Forced Evictions/Fear of Use of Excessive Force, supra note 6. 
67 See id. 
68 See id.; Inter-Am. C.H.R., supra note 5, ch. VIII. 
69 See UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, DRC: Displacement, inse-
curity worsen humanitarian crisis in east, IRIN, Sept. 18, 2007, http://www.irinnews.org/Re- 
port.aspx?ReportId=74357; UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 
Uganda: Displaced families in two minds over return home, IRIN, Aug. 9, 2007, http://www. 
irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=73654. 
70 See Róisín Hennessy, Defining States’ International Legal Obligations to Cooperate for the 
Achievement of Human Development: One Aspect of Operationalising a Human Rights-Based Ap-
proach to Development, in Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2002, at 73, 74 (Mar-
tin Scheinin & Markku Suksi eds., 2005); DAC, supra note 48, at 3–6. 
71 See generally Piron & O’Neil, supra note 48 (providing numerous examples of hu-
man rights-based development through cooperation between states and agencies of inter-
national organizations, such as UNICEF). 
72 See U.N. Development Programme, U.N. Millennium Project, Investing in De-
velopment: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals 119–
20 (2005) [hereinafter Millennium Project Plan]; World Bank Operational Manual, 
supra note 65, at OP 4.12; see also Dinah Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in a Globalized 
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itly consent to and adopt this practice in their development planning 
and operations.73 Much of state practice consists of verbal acts regard-
ing the policies of an international organization, such as the World 
Bank’s policy regarding involuntary resettlement.74 Some states have 
also acted by implementing these policies through development 
agreements with the international organization.75 
 The practices of the World Bank and the United Nations represent 
the essential consensus of state practice,76 and one defining element of 
customary international law.77 Each division of an international organi-
zation derives its authority from the agreement of a substantial number 
of member states.78 The policies and practices of those organizations 
thus represent the consensus of a number of states.79 The policies and 
practices can therefore support the emergence of a custom in interna-
tional law. 
 Human rights-based development can be categorized into three 
main attributes: development policies aimed at fulfilling human rights; 
programming that focuses on both the holders of the rights (rights-
holders) and the entity obligated to protect and promote those rights, 
such as the state (duty-bearers); and human rights-based standards to 
evaluate projects.80 The UN Development Program’s Millennium Pro-
ject exemplifies the creation of human rights-conscious development 
policies.81  The Millennium Project developed ten goals (Millennium 
Development Goals) representing fundamental human rights that are 
                                                                                                                      
World, 25 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 273, 289–90 (2002) (discussing the World Bank’s 
transition to more human rights-conscious program mechanisms). 
73 See, e.g., Chad-Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 10, 17, 19, 20, 44, Mar. 29, 2001, 
available at http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=51351038&piPK= 
51351152&theSitePK=40941&projid=P044305 [hereinafter Chad Loan Agreement]. 
74 See, e.g., World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 65, OP 4.12. 
75 See, e.g., Cameroon-Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev., 9, 20, 39, Mar. 29, 2001, 
available at http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=51351038&piPK= 
51351152&theSitePK=40941&projid=P044305 (follow “document no. 11” hyperlink) [here-
inafter Cameroon Loan Agreement]. 
76 See ILA Report 2000, supra note 41, at 730; David A. Wirth, Partnership Advocacy in 
World Bank Environmental Reform, in The Struggle For Accountability 51, 56 ( Jonathan 
A. Fox & L. David Brown eds., 1998); see also Weiss, supra note 47, at 352 (noting that the 
“guidelines, principles and recommended practices” of multinational organizations “are 
sometimes influential legal instruments”). 
77 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–82, 884. 
78 See ILA Report 2000, supra note 42, at 730. 
79 See id.; Wirth, supra note 76, at 56. 
80 See OHCHR, supra note 10, at 15–16. 
81 See id. at 8; Millennium Project Plan, supra note 72, at 2–3, 7–8, 118, 119, 120. 
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to be advanced through development agreements.82 For example, the 
first Millennium Development Goal to alleviate extreme poverty and 
hunger protects economic rights such as the right to earn a livelihood 
and the right to property.83 The Millennium Project’s success relies on 
participant states’ integration of those human rights-based policies into 
development plans, and the Project, therefore, makes numerous pro-
gramming recommendations, such as the use of human rights assess-
ments.84 
 The World Bank’s pipeline project in Brazil and Bolivia is an ex-
ample of programming that targeted rights-holders.85 The pipeline pro-
ject posed a unique planning challenge, because similar development 
in the region had caused involuntary resettlement and infringements 
of the rights of the indigenous peoples.86 Although human rights-based 
approaches were not conditions of the loan agreement,87 the project 
addressed anticipated problems through the creation of community-
based organizations that consulted the local population on regulations 
and assessments.88 The project also addressed resettlement and com-
pensation for land loss by granting more secure land rights and paying 
a share of project funds to local landowners in exchange for an ease-
ment for the pipeline to pass through their land.89 The overall success 
of these mechanisms was noted in follow-up evaluations conducted by 
the World Bank.90 
 The World Bank’s Operational Policies now explicitly require bor-
rower states to engage in human rights-conscious development plan-
ning to address involuntary resettlement, and thus propose program-
ming aimed at duty-bearers.91 Operational Policy 4.12 recognizes that 
involuntary resettlement is related to two fundamental human rights: 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Millennium Project Plan, supra note 72, at 2–3, 7–8, 118, 119, 120. 
83 See id. at 7–8 (discussing how empowering poor people with property rights can en-
able the use of infrastructure and human capital that is vital to growth in agriculture and 
other economies); see also Bujal Charter, supra note 38, arts. 14, 21 (regarding the right to 
property), ICESCR, supra note 7, art. 6 (recognizing, implicitly, the right to earn a liveli-
hood). 
84 See Millennium Project Plan, supra note 72, at 118, 119, 120. 
85 World Bank, Infrastructure at the Crossroads 73 (2006). 
86 See Inter-Am. C.H.R., Res. No. 12/85, supra note 65, 1–3, 5–9. 
87 See Letter from Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev. to Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., 
Amendment to the Loan Agreement ( July 2, 1996), available at http://go.worldbank.org/ 
L082550W20; Int’l Bank for Reconstruction and Dev.-Petroleo Brasileiro S.A., Oct. 26, 
1992, available at http://go.worldbank.org/VHJWFQHXI0. 
88 See Inf. Crossroads, supra note 85, at 73. 
89 Id. 
90 See id.; World Bank, Project Performance Assessment Report, at xii–iii (2003). 
91 See World Bank Operational Manual, supra note 65, OP 4.12. 
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the right to property and the right to earn a livelihood.92 The World 
Bank obligates borrower states, as a condition of the loan agreement, to 
respect these human rights in development plans, and directs that 
states should explore alternative project designs, engage in resettle-
ment planning with affected groups, and set aside sufficient resources 
to compensate involuntary resettlement.93 
 Chad and Cameroon, as duty-bearers, implemented Operational 
Policy 4.12 as required under their loan agreements with the World 
Bank for oil development and construction of a pipeline, and experi-
enced some success in addressing losses of property and livelihoods.94 
Both countries used periodic human rights assessments to gauge effects 
on livelihoods and real property, although the monitoring needed im-
provement.95 Chad and Cameroon enacted compensation plans to ad-
dress the involuntary taking of land and paid sufficient compensation 
to some of the affected individuals.96 Chad also developed agricultural 
training programs to offset losses of livelihoods and land.97 
 The European Union’s (EU) trade and investment policies are 
examples of how human rights may be used as a standard to assess per-
formance in development.98 For example, the 2000 Cotonou Agree-
ment on trade and development between EU member states and 77 
foreign states provides that human rights violations trigger a dialogue 
                                                                                                                      
92 Operational Policy 4.12 states that involuntary resettlement is defined by the taking 
of land, which can result from a “loss of income sources or means of livelihood, whether or 
not the affected persons must move to another location” among other factors. See id. 
93  See id. 
94 See Cameroon Loan Agreement, supra note 75, at 9, 20, 39; Chad Loan Agreement, 
supra note 73, at 10, 17, 19, 20, 44; Robert Barclay & George Koppert, Chad Reset-
tlement and Compensation Plan Evaluation Study: Main Report, at v–vii ( Jan. 2007) 
[hereinafter Chad Resettlement Study]. Despite some success, the project was termi-
nated in August 2008 due to Chad’s failure to meet other conditions of the financing 
agreement. See Press Release, World Bank, World Bank Statement on Chad-Cameroon 
Pipeline (Sept. 9, 2008), available at www.worldbank.org (follow “News” hyperlink; then 
follow “Press Releases” hyperlink; then input September 9 2008 into the search browser). 
95 See Int’l Advisory Group, Report of Mission 12 to Chad and Cameroon: April 
30 to May 24, 2007, at 40–41 ( July 18, 2007) [hereinafter IAG Report 2007]; Chad Re-
settlement Study, supra note 94, at v–viii. 
96 See IAG Report 2007, supra note 95, at i; Chad Resettlement Study, supra note 94, 
at v–vi. 
97 See Chad Resettlement Study, supra note 94, at 5-1–5-5. 
98 See U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative of the Secre-
tary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises add. 3 (Human Rights Policies and Management Practices: Results from Questionnaire 
Surveys of Governments and Fortune Global 500 Firms), ¶¶ 31–34, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/35/ 
Add.3 (Feb. 28, 2007) (prepared by John Ruggie). 
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between state parties, and, if they persist, can result in sanctions or sus-
pension of development projects.99 
III. Analysis 
 The policies and procedures established and implemented by other 
states provide a useful framework for amending DRC and Uganda’s 
2007 Agreement.100 The incorporation of human rights-based develop-
ment policies, programming addressed to both rights-holders and duty-
bearers, and human rights standards to guide project evaluations could 
minimize anticipated infringement of economic rights, consistent with 
DRC and Uganda’s obligations under international law.101 
A. Policies 
 The process of amending the 2007 Agreement must begin with the 
acknowledgment of the fundamental rights of the Lake Albert popula-
tion.102 DRC and Uganda’s task would benefit from following the ex-
ample of the Millennium Project.103 Formation of the Millennium Pro-
ject’s goals began with recognition of empirical links between certain 
phenomena and poverty.104 Those phenomena thus became the goals 
or policies to be addressed through development projects.105 Similarly, 
the experiences of other states have already demonstrated the well-
established link between oil exploitation, environmental degradation, 
and resulting violations of certain economic rights.106 The local popula-
tions in the Lake Albert region, most notably the fishermen, have al-
ready suffered damage to their means of livelihood from initial oil-
related activities.107 Thus, DRC and Uganda have a starting point from 
which to form development policies: oil exploitation in Lake Albert 
should not damage the environment so as to infringe on the right to 
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adequate living conditions, the right to earn a livelihood, and the right 
to property.108 
 The establishment of a rights-based policy sets the boundaries for 
development activities by highlighting the key issues that must be ad-
dressed in programming.109 For example, DRC and Uganda have iden-
tified the specific rights-holders who should be targeted in program-
ming as the population living within range of the development 
activities that could be affected by changes to waterways from construc-
tion of the pipeline, as well as possible oil leaks and spills.110 An addi-
tional group of rights-holders is composed of fishermen whose liveli-
hood is currently dependent on the viability of Lake Albert.111 
B. Programming for Rights-Holders and Duty-Bearers 
 State action pursuant to World Bank development agreements has 
provided numerous programmatic details to protect the human rights 
in the suggested 2007 Agreement policy amendment.112 Moreover, the 
shortcomings of prior attempts can provide valuable information.113 
For example, an oil spill in Cameroon highlighted the need for meas-
ures targeting duty-bearers, in order to prevent environmental damage 
from infringing on adequate living conditions.114 DRC and Uganda can 
take these proactive steps by providing for management training to 
prepare local authorities to effectively deal with oil leaks and spills.115 
Funding the construction of local fire departments and emergency first 
aid centers could minimize the degree of damage.116 Preventive meas-
ures can also be adopted in relation to rights-holders, such as the dis-
semination of emergency information to the public and creation of a 
hotline or reporting center to ensure that locals have the means to 
promptly report environmental hazards.117 A multi-faceted emergency 
plan can thus ensure that accidents are contained and do not erode 
local living conditions.118 
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 Monitoring has been perhaps the most successful tool for address-
ing the effects of development on the right to a livelihood and the right 
to property, and it can be employed by both duty-bearers and rights-
holders.119 Monitoring by rights-holders was implemented in pipeline 
projects in South America and Africa through the creation of commu-
nity-based groups.120 By establishing local organizations, DRC and 
Uganda can create a direct information network between the Lake Al-
bert population and duty-bearers.121 Rights-holders can thus provide 
information on the day-to-day effects of oil development, and suggest 
reforms to address new needs.122 
 DRC and Uganda, as duty-bearers, should also employ top-down 
monitoring by conducting frequent social impact assessments to gauge 
the effects of development on livelihoods and land claims.123 The avail-
ability and quality of current resources, such as fish, which are related 
to local livelihoods, can be determined by conducting a social impact 
assessment prior to initiating new development activities.124 Addition-
ally, a risk analysis would better enable DRC and Uganda to plan for the 
anticipated extent of environmental change and impact to livelihoods 
and property.125 Regular social impact assessments throughout the pro-
ject can reveal changes in resources and land that may affect economic 
rights and require modification of development activities.126 Further-
more, the success of loss-mitigating programs may be inferred from 
maintained livelihoods.127 
 Nonetheless, considering the empirical link between oil exploita-
tion and environmental degradation,128 comprehensive amendments to 
the 2007 Agreement should include programs for rights-holders to 
adapt their livelihoods to changing conditions.129 Chad’s training pro-
grams on sustainable fishing practices had some success in preserving 
the right to a livelihood despite changing conditions.130 While DRC and 
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Uganda should implement similar sustainable practices training now, 
there are already indications of significant reductions in fishing 
catches.131 Therefore, the 2007 Agreement should also prepare for the 
worst case scenario: job and skills substitution training, such as incorpo-
rating the local population into the labor force for the oil development 
project.132 
 Similarly, the 2007 Agreement should provide for a full resettle-
ment plan.133 Monitoring programs and satellite imagery can assist in 
the determination of property to be seized, as well as land rights that 
have been otherwise adversely affected.134 Compensation for loss of 
land may be paid through the revenues from oil development.135 Simi-
lar to the land claims database employed by Chad, the advanced prepa-
ration of a system to classify claims according to assessed value may 
shorten delays in delivering compensation; however, any system should 
remain flexible to adapt to unexpected changes, such as larger than 
anticipated land losses.136 
C. Standards for Evaluation 
 The articulation of DRC and Uganda’s human rights policy estab-
lished a broad standard from which to assess future oil exploitation.137 
Violations of advanced economic rights by either state should trigger a 
dialogue, if necessary with an intermediary party.138 Further violations 
and failure to redress prior violations where possible should incur sanc-
tions, such as limitations on cooperative activities related to oil devel-
opment.139 Yet, while the “violation” of certain economic rights is admi-
rable in breadth, it begs the question of when a “violation” is deemed to 
occur.140 The 2007 Agreement could further tailor the threshold for a 
“violation” based on the findings of initial social impact assessments 
and risk analyses.141 
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Conclusion 
 It remains to be seen whether the discovery of shared oil reserves 
beneath Lake Albert will be a blessing or a curse for DRC and Uganda. 
It is in the common interests of both countries to find an equitable so-
lution that will encourage foreign investment, ensure project safety, and 
create the necessary infrastructure for export. A solution to anticipated 
human rights violations will be necessary to ensure the successful com-
pletion of these goals. To this end, the emerging customary norm of 
human rights-based development should be the basis for amendments 
to DRC and Uganda’s 2007 Agreement. The policies and practices of 
international organizations and states reflect an emerging custom that 
also provides valuable amendment proposals. DRC and Uganda have 
unquestionable obligations to assure that the rights of the Lake Albert 
population are protected; moreover, they now have the knowledge to 
do so. 
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